Since the debacle in Cyprus one question has been at the back of every commentators mind: who’s next? Naturally those countries with the same characteristics as Cyprus have been main contenders – those with a large financial sector relative to their economy.
Slovenia in particular has been singled out as the next potential recipient of a bail out by the Euro zone The country has a large financial sector equaling around 130% of GDP. Although at much smaller level than Cyprus at 700%, the IMF estimates that up 20% of the loans in Slovenia’s biggest banks are non-performing or near default. This could put more pressure on the Slovenian government to help bail out the sector. The markets have already reacted to such foreseen events. Ten year bond yields rose to a record 6.8% yesterday, whilst two year yields have tripled in the past week rising from 1.2% to 4.26%. Furthermore the cost of insuring debt against default has significantly increased as shown by the graph below.
These movements show that investors are factoring in the higher risk of government default and contagion from Cyprus. Such increases mean higher costs for government borrowing which will in turn make raising any funds to recapitalize banks harder to obtain. To further confound the situation, the IMF has predicted that the economy will decline this year by 2% and the recent political turmoil has done little to reassure investors.
Luxembourg too may become another victim of the Cyprus contagion. As the graph below shows Luxembourg’s banking assets sit above 2,500% of GDP by far the largest of any other Euro zone member.
As the Cyprus situation unravels investors will look to other euro zone economies which they may consider to have unsustainable large financial sectors. In this sense they are unsustainable because the sectors have become so large that the government would not be able to fund a bailout. Luxembourg however does have one advantage, most of the banks in the country are foreign owned subsidiaries, with domestic banks only accounting for 8% of the sector. This means in the event of a major banking crisis these banks may be aided by their parent banks. Nevertheless, the risk still exists and such support is never guaranteed especially if such parent banks are facing difficulties in their own countries.
One thing has become evidently clear from the crises in both Cyprus and previously Iceland. Promoting yourself as a tax haven for large financial companies and allowing the sector to far outgrow the size of the economy is an unsustainable development strategy. The risks of a banking sector collapse certainly outweigh the benefits as shown by the current situation in Cyprus. Furthermore promoting this strategy in a currency union further confounds the problem, when the ability to ease monetary policy is foregone.
Unfortunately the handling of the Cyprus situation, most importantly the deposit tax, has made investors even more wary of leaving their money in such countries. The Euro zone now finds that although it may have solved one crisis, the length of time and the conditions applied now mean that more crises are bound to appear elsewhere.